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NOTES
IS CHARITABLE IMMUNITY ON THE WAY OUT?
For many years the courts of our country have adhered to the
doctrine that charities are immune from tort liability. With the
increase in the number and size of charities, the "big business"
scale of their activities, the complexity of modem life, advanced
business methods and the protection afforded by liability insurance,
the problem of their tort liability has taken on completely new
aspects from the time when the immunity was first afforded them.
Today every citizen regardless of financial position is exposed
at one time or another to the risks of injury by some charitable
activity. It need only be remembered that many of the motor ve-
hicles on the streets and highways today are owned and operated
by charities, to substantiate the truth of this statement. There are
voices from many quarters calling for a reappraisal of this entire
time-honored, but seemingly unjust, doctrine. During the past
few years several states have abandoned this doctrine. Some, by
overruling long standing precedents, others by legislation.
Questions involving the applicability of statutes, whether the de-
fendant is in fact a charity, whether the injury inflicted was in the
course of a charitable activity, whether the actor was the servant
of the charity and whether the servant was within the scope of
his employment are omitted from this discussion. In the typical
case the following facts are usually present: (1) the institution
is a charity; (2) no statutes impose liability or immunity upon the
charity; (3) the charity or its servant was negligent; (4) it acted
in the performance of a charitable activity; and (5) the plaintiff
was injured through no fault of his own.
HISTORICAL. BACKGROUND
The doctrine declaring charities to be immune from tort liability
was first pronounced in this country in McDonald v. Massachusetts
General Hospital.' The decision in that case relied upon an English
case decided in 1861. The second case to uphold this doctrine in
1. "... . it has been held that they are not liable if proper care has been used by
them in selecting those who were actually to perform the work. Holliday v. St.
Leonard's, 11 C.B. (N.S.) 192. The liability of the defendant corporation can
extend no further than this; ... ." McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hos-
pital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529, 532 (1876).
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America arose in Maryland in 1885. This case, Perry v. House
of Refuge,2 held that the funds of the defendant institution could
not be used to compensate an inmate for an assault committed upon
him by one of its officers in the infliction of punishment. This de-
cision also got its sole justification from an English case decided
in 1846, since there were no prior decisions in Maryland to follow.
It is interesting to note that this doctrine had been repudiated in
England prior to its adoption in this country. Blackburn, J., speak-
ing for the English court in Forenan v. Canterbury Corporation,8
said:
There was one case cited in the course of the argument (Holli-
day v. St. Leonard, Shoreditch), but, upon looking at the reasons
of that decision, we consider it to be overruled by the decision
of the House of Lords in the case of Mersey Docks v. Gibbs
... it was decided that a public body like the local board of health
are answerable for the negligence of their servants, just as if
they were acting as servants of a private person, . . . and they
would have to pay the damages out of the funds in their hands
as a local board of health.
The American courts are divided over this doctrine of non-liability
and under what circumstances it is to apply. In Gable v. Salvation
Arny,4 a 1940 case, the Oklahoma court said:
Even the most cursory research makes it apparent that there
is no ground upon which this doctrine of non-liability has been
rested by one court that has not been assailed and criticized
at length by some other court, notwithstanding the fact that
they both arrive at the same conclusion in their decisions.
LEGAL THiEoRmIs IN SUPPORT OV IMMUNITY
The advocates of the doctrine of immunity of charities from lia-
bility for damages in tort base their reasoning upon one or more
of the following theories:5 (1) the trust fund theory; (2) the
2. "In the case of Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark and Fin.
507, in the House of Lords, it was decided that 'if charity trustees are guilty
of a breach of trust, the person thereby injured has no right to be indemnified
by damages out of the trust fund'.
"In the absence of any decisions in Maryland, we are constrained to adopt
the exposition of principles by these eminent English judges, and are thus led
to the determination, that damages cannot be recovered from a fund held in
trust for charitable purposes." Yellott, J. in Perry v. House of Refuge, 63
Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495, 500 (1885).
3. L. R. 6 Q. B. 214, 217 (Eng. 1871). See also Gold v. Essex County
Council, 2 K.B. 293 (1942), 2 All Eng. 237 (C.A.) (1942).
4. 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244, 246 (1940).
5. See Annotation in 25 A.L.R. 2d 29.
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theory that charities are exempted from the doctrine of respondeat
superior; (3) the theory that privately conducted charities are agen-
cies of the government and therefore entitled to the government's
immunity from suit; (4) the theory that a beneficiary of a charity
is deemed to have waived any claims against negligence of the charity
and to have assumed the risk of such negligence; and (5) the public
policy theory.
1. Trust fund theory. The principal reason advanced for this
theory is that the funds of a charity are held in trust for the bene-
ficiaries and the diversion of these funds to pay tort claims would
defeat the useful purpose of the charitable institution.6 It is the
contention of others that since the funds are set aside for a specific
purpose, they cannot be used for another.
7
A "qualified" liability is enforced in many instances and the chari-
ty is only liable if a person is injured as the result of torts of em-
ployees who were at the time discharging duties of the corporation.8
The reason given for not having absolute immunity is that the rule
as to trust funds has been extended too far and tends to foster negli-
gence while liability tends to induce care and caution in the selection
of employees and the standard of care exercised. 9
Those rejecting the trust fund theory altogether give different
reasons in support of their beliefs. Some maintain that it has
no real basis in the law of trusts since only technical immunity is
afforded trust funds;1° others insist that charities are no longer in
the position where they are unable to absorb losses for payments
of damages since modern charities are no longer composed of small,
struggling institutions, 1 1 and that in those jurisdictions which have
no immunity, there is no evidence of any decline in the number of
these institutions or the crippling of services offered by them as a
result of their being liable for damages. 12 Finally, it has been recog-
nized that liability insurance could readily absorb the risk involved.
6. Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649
(1916) ; Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991, 2
L.R.A. (N.S.) 556, 4 Ann. Cas. 103 (1905).
7. Anderson v. Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171 S.W. 2d 401 (1943); St.
Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 P. 22, 42 A.L.R. 964 (1925).
8. Weston's Administratrix v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va.
587, 107 S.E. 785, 23 A.L.R. 907 (1921).
9. Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939).
10. Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940).
11. Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Association, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d
151 (1950).
12. Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230, 25 A.L.R.
2d 1 (1950).
19551 NoT,s
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2. Respondeat Superior doctrine not applicable. The cases that
follow the theory that a charity is exempted from the doctrine of
respondeat superior base their belief on the grounds of public policy.13
It is said that a charity does not derive any profits from the services
of its employees whereas other enterprises are carried on for the
benefits of a master and he should be liable for the torts of his
servant because he is benefited financially by having servants. 14
Some courts allow paying patients and strangers to the charity
to recover for injuries inflicted by the charity and yet recovery is
denied if the person is a non-paying patient. Among the cases ex-
pressing the view that this theory of exempting charities from the
doctrine of respondeat superior does not hold up because of incon-
sistencies, is Ray v. Tucson Medical Center.15 The Arizona court
points out that the reason given for the view that respondeat superior
does not apply is that the charity is a non-profit institution. The
court goes on to say that if this be true, then it can make no differ-
ence whether the patient pays or does not pay or whether the claimant
is a stranger to the charity, since the character of the institution
as a non-profit organization is not changed by this distinction. It
pointed out in this connection that some of the courts favoring the
theory say that the doctrine of respondeat superior does apply to
strangers and paying patients but does not apply to non-paying pa-
tients. The court concludes: "It reduces itself to an absurdity to
say that ... the doctrine does not apply to nonpaying patients."
3. Governmental immunity theory. This theory is predicated on
the idea that charitable institutions are exempt from liability for
negligent injuries to patients 'on the ground that they are mere in-
strumentalities brought into being to aid in the performance of
governmental or public duties, are exempt from taxation, and are
supported by state appropriations in some instances.
16
On the other hand, one court, in Cohen v. General Hospital Socie-
ty,17 held that even though the hospital was receiving aid from the
state in the form of tax exemptions and appropriations, it was not
immune from liability since it was not performing a governmental
duty.
13. Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649
(1916).
14. Backman v. Y.W.C.A., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751, 30 A.L.R. 448
(1922).
15. 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951).
16. Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W.
476 (1935); University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W.
219 14 L.tLA. (n.s.) 784, 128 Am. St. Rep. 355 (1907).
17. 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 435 (1931).
[Vol. 7
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4. Implied waiver or assumption of risk theory. This theory (ap-
plicable only where the injured party is a beneficiary of the charity)
is based on the assumption that a person who accepts the benefits
of a charity assents to the exemption of his benefactor from liability
and assumes the risk of negligence.' 8
The opposition to this theory of implied waiver maintains that
it is impossible to say that the recipient of the benefits has knowingly
agreed to waive any claim for negligence. The court, in Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese,19 rejected the waiver theory, saying:
The waiver theory is only fiction. It can have no foundation
of fact in many cases. It cannot be said that a patient taken
to a hospital in an unconscious condition knowingly waived the
right to recover for negligence that might occur while the pa-
tient was still unconscious. Neither can it be said that a small
child in attending a church service knowingly waived the right
to recover for negligence. The theory is based upon nothing
but the assumption of an implied contract against future negli-
gence.
5. Public policy theory. Public policy is apparently the theory
used by most of the courts in support of the doctrine that a charitable
institution is immune from tort liability as a result of its negligence.
It is said that all the other theories are merely different names for
the same idea since they are all encompassed by the "public policy"
doctrine.20 It is also said to be public policy to encourage charitable
institutions. In the belief that it is better for the community at
large that the injured individual bear the loss than to hold the
charity in damages, immunity is gra'nted. 2 '
It is interesting to note that "public policy" requires the immunity
rule in some jurisdictions and the liability rule for charities in others.22
The public policy of South Carolina requires charitable institutions
to be exempted from liability in damages for negligence resulting
in personal injuries or death,2 3 but permits liability for damages
resulting from the creation of a nuisance.24 In other states it is
18. "One who accepts the benefit either of a public or a private charity
enters into a relation which exempts his benefactor from liability for the
negligence of his servants in administering the charity." Powers v. Homo-
pathic Hospital, 190 Fed. 294, 307, (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 183 U.S. 695 (1901).
19. See note 12 supra.
20. See note 11 supra.
21. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 595 (1895).
22. See note 15 supra.
23. Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914); Vermillion
-v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).
24. Peden v. Furman University, 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930).
195]
5
Spence: Is Charitable Immunity on the Way Out
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
denied that the public desires that the charities be immune from tort
liability for their negligence, or that of their employees, when in-
jury occurs as a result of such negligence. In Welch v. Frisbie,2 5
the New Hampshire court agrees that the judiciary undoubtedly
has the power to declare what the public policy is, but that it should
only do so when there is a united state of mind prevailing or legisla-
tive announcement of it. The case holds that since it is hard to
say just when the public interest will be better served, and due to
the absence of legislation to the contrary, the ordinary rules of
agency should apply, including the principle of respondeat superior.
The decision seems to be based on the fact that there is no evidence
of any state of the public mind favoring immunity of charities from
tort liability.
DIsTINCTION BTWEEN STRANGERS AND BENEFICIARIES
Determining the difference between a stranger and a beneficiary
has given the courts much difficulty in those jurisdictions where this
difference is material to the liability of the charity, e.g., a servant
of the charity, a visitor of a patient, a patron of museums or other
places of entertainment, or a private nurse hired by a patient.
Before proceeding with the distinction the cases draw between
a stranger and a beneficiary, it is necessary to note that the status
of the victim is immaterial where the charity enjoys no immunity
whatsoever,28 or where it enjoys "complete" immunity.
2 7
Charities are immune from tort liability to beneficiaries in many
instances, but when the negligently injured person is a "stranger,"
the same courts hold the charity liable.28 A stranger is defined as
one who receives no benefit from the charity nor is employed by it.
On the other hand, a beneficiary is spoken of as one who is receiv-
ing some type of benefit from the charity at the time of the injury.
This raises an interesting question. Is a paying patient a recipient
of the charity and therefore to be classed as a beneficiary? In
Williams v. Union County Hospital Association,2 9 the North Caro-
25. See note 9 supra.
26. See note 15 supra.
27. Irrespective of the status of the injured person as a beneficiary of the
charity or a stranger, and irrespective of the nature of the negligence as the
negligence of the defendant corporation or one of its servants, the defendant,
if shown to be a charity, was held immune from liability for the death of a
paying patron of a musical entertainment in its new auditorium, upon whom
the balcony fell while the entertainment was in progress. Vermillion v. Wo-
man's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).
28. Walker v. Memorial Hospital, 187 Va. 5, 45 S.E. 2d 898 (1948).
29. 234 N.C. 536, 67 S.E. 2d 662 (1951).
[Vol. 7
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lina court at least commented that a paying patient is not a recipient
of the charity.
EriCT Or LIABILITY INSURANcE
Why do charitable institutions secure liability insurance in juris-
dictions where they are immune from tort liability? This may be
answered by the fact that these institutions want to take no chances.
But then, it inay be due to their prudent recognition that the sub-
stantive law is always subject to change or modification as public
policy also changes. Still another reason is given by the court of
Wisconsin in Schau v. Morgan,3 0 decided in 1942:
We will take notice that public liability insurance policies cover
the cost of defense. When a charitable institution is made a
defendant it must defend the action whether or not it can be
held liable. No doubt, charitable institutions deem it good
business judgment to protect themselves against the costs of
the defense of such actions, as well as from loss through liability
imposed by law.
It seems to be implied, by the court, that even in those jurisdic-
tions granting immunity for the negligent acts of servants, the in-
stitution may be liable for the negligent selection of such personnel
in the first place.
Thus it seems that the immunity of a charity from tort liability
is not lost by the fact that the charity carries liability insurance. In
support of this rule, the Connecticut court, in Cristini v. Griffin,31
said that the result of a contrary rule would be that a plaintiff negli-
gently injured in an insured hospital would get a judgment while a
plaintiff injured in an uninsured hospital would not, and that such a
distinction has no logical basis.
Contrariwise, in 1950 the Illinois court held that where insurance
exists and thereby provides a fund from which damages for tort
liability may be collected without impairing the trust fund, the de-
fense of immunity is not available.8 2 Another argument in favor of
fixing liability upon charitable institutions protected by liability in-
surance is based on the assertion that the public policy considerations
that demanded the immunity in the first place have changed.3 3 Could
30. 241 Wis. 334, 6 N.W. 2d 212, 216 (1942).
31. 134 Conn. 282, 57 A. 2d 262 (1948).
32. Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950).
33. The court takes judicial notice of the extensive use of the many types
of hospitalization insurance by the public, as well as liability insurance by the
institutions, and comes to the conclusion that "times have changed and are
now changing in the business, social, economic and legal worlds." Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hospital Association, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151, 154 (1950).
19551
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the practicability of insurance coverage have been determinant of the
change in public policy?
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
This controversial doctrine first found its way into South Caro-
lina law in 1913. In Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 4 in which the
plaintiff, a paying patient who was allegedly burned through the
negligence of one of the nurses employed by the defendant, received
a verdict in the lower court. After argument before the Supreme
Court, and affirmance of the judgment below by a bare majority,
the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed the judgment below.
It is interesting to note that six of the fifteen justices and judges
dissented, and that the majority was composed of Chief Justice
Gary and another Justice of the Supreme Court and seven Circuit
Judges, while the dissent was composed of three of the justices of
the Supreme Court and three Circuit Judges. The majority, after
deciding that the defendant was a charitable institution, held that it
would be against public policy to hold a charitable institution respon-
sible for the negligence of its servants, because to do otherwise
would dissipate the trust funds.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Fraser asserts the belief that:
We think the Courts ought to hold the fund, first to repair
the evil done by itself, because the purpose of the trust is to
do good and not evil .... The purpose of the trust is to relieve
suffering, and not to increase it, when, in the administration of
the trust, suffering is increased, the purpose fails. The courts
that declare immunity are destroying and not maintaining the
trust.8 5
Two years after the decision in the Lindler case, supra, another
case arose in which a charitable institution was sued for damages
for injuries sustained when the balcony of the defendant's new audi-
torium collapsed during a musical program. In this case, Vermillion
v. Woman's College of Due West,36 the plaintiff attempted to distin-
guish his case from the Lindler case, supra, in that: (1) the injured
person in the instant case was a stranger to the charity instead of
a beneficiary and had paid for admittance to the program; (2) the
injury was a result of the negligence of the corporation itself, or
its officers, in failing to provide a safe place for an invited guest
34. 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
35. Id. at 40.
36. 104 S.C. 197,88 S.E. 649 (1916).
[Vol. 7
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whereas in the preceding case the negligence was that of a servant
of the charity. In rejecting these distinctions the court said:
These differences in the facts of the two cases make no differ-
ence in the applicable law, because the exemption 6f public chari-
ties from liability in actions for damages for tort rests not upon
the relation of the injured person to the charity, but upon
grounds of public policy, which forbid the crippling or destruc-
tion of charities which are established for the benefit of the
whole public to compensate one or more individual members of
the public for injuries inflicted by the negligence of the corpora-
tion itself, or of its superior officers or agents, or of its servants
or employees.
37
The court also answered the statement that there was no remedy
against the actual wrongdoer when the servant is insolvent, by say-
ing that "the law does not undertake to provide a solvent defendant
for every wrong done."'38 This case would seem to put South Caro-
lina among those states which give complete immunity.
However, in the next case in which a charity was sued for damages,
Peden v. Furman University,3 9 the alleged liability was not for in-
juries to the person but rather to the property of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sought to enjoin a baseball association from using a
field leased to them by the defendant for the playing of baseball and
sued the defendant for damages allegedly caused by the creation of a
nuisance. The lower court directed a verdict for the defendant on
the ground that it is an eleemosynary institution, and as such, cannot
be held liable in such an action; and stated as the reason therefor,
that it fell within the doctrine laid down by the Vermillion case, supra.
This was reversed by the Supreme Court. It was held that the
two cases are not analogous, in that the plaintiff in the present case
was not basing his claim upon the principle of respondeat superior
or the negligence of the defendant or its servants, but alleged that
the defendant had created a nuisance and damaged the plaintiff as
a result. The court, speaking through Mr. Acting Justice Wyche,
said:
In our opinion, an eleemosynary institution cannot use its pro-
perty in such a way as to prevent others from enjoying the
use of theirs, and, if it uses the property in such a manner as
to become a nuisance it makes itself liable for damages.40
37. Id. at 200.
38. Id. at 201.
39. 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930).
40. Id. at 16.
1955] Nom~
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In Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 41 the issue was whether a
charitable organization or institution was liable for compensation
as an employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In holding
the defendant liable, the court reviewed the Lindler and Vermillion
cases, supra, and came to the conclusion that it was bound by stare
decisis and therefore the Workmen's Compensation Act did not
apply to a charitable institution since it enjoys full immunity from
liability in South Carolina.
In the most recent South Carolina case concerning the applicabili-
ty of this doctrine of immunity, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical
Cooperative, Inc.,42 the case turned on the charitable status of the
defendant. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a de-
cision by the United States District Court which had held that the
defendant Cooperative served a laudable public purpose and that it
was therefore exempt from liability.43 In reversing this decision
the circuit court said that a rural electric cooperative is not designed
to accomplish the purposes of a charitable institution and does not
belong in the same category since it is essentially a business project
designed to promote the convenience and material welfare of its mem-
bers rather than the common good.
Summing up the law of South Carolina, it would seem that chari-
ties are exempted from liability in damages for negligence resulting
in personal injuries or death 44 but are liable for property damages
resulting from a nuisance.
45
CONCLUSION
While this division as to tort immunity for charities is prevailing
within the courts, the opinion among scholars and law review writers
outside the courts almost uniformly supports the doctrine of liability
as against that of immunity. 46 Some courts recognized this authori-
ty as a guide to follow when deciding whether earlier cases should
be overruled, or when ruling on the question as one of first impres-
41. 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E. 2d 788 (1948).
42. 215 Fed. 2d 542 (4th Cir. 1954).
43. 118 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. S.C. 1954).
44. See note 22 supra.
45. See note 24 supra.
46. PROSSER, ToRTs 1079-85 (1941) ; HARPER, TORTS § 294 (1933). See the
following articles that advocate abandoning the immunity rule: 20 U. or CIN.
L. Rxv. 412 (1951); 24 RocKy MT. L. REv. 71 (1951); 37 VA. L. Rpv. 1159
(1951); 5 VALD. L. REv. 259 (1952); 32 N. C. L. REv. 129 (1953).
(Vol. 7
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sion.47 The court, in Ray v. Tucson Medical Center,48 says:
The writers of these articles occupy a position with respect to
the advancement of the judicial body of the law similar to that
of the corps of engineers to an advancing army. Unfettered
by precedent and stare decisis these gentlemen are always in
the vanguard of the progressive march of the body of the law,
constructing bridges, as it were, and clearing the way for ad-
vanced positions which may be safely contained when surrounded
by new and changing social, political and economic conditions.
They are quick to recognize the development of a social policy
and are instrumental in crystallizing it into a fixed concept which
the legislature and the courts denominate "public policy."
The reasons given by these scholars for abandoning the doctrine
of immunity may be summed up as follows: (1) that neither those
who organize charitable institutions nor the courts have authority
to put charities beyond the law which is applicable to all; (2) this
English doctrine which was adopted in this country has long since
been repudiated in England; (3) many courts are only following
precedent under the rule of stare decisis; (4) charities may carry
liability insurance in order to prevent depletion of any trust fund by
payment of damages; (5) "public policy" has changed if it ever did
favor immunity; and (6) charities should not be permitted to in-
flict injury upon some, without the right of redress, in order to be-
stow charity on others, but the burden of an innocent victim should
be shifted to the community at large.
Some courts which advocate the abolition of this doctrine or recog-
nize the need of its abolition, contend that so fundamental a change
should come only by legislation.49 Others have recognized it to be
the responsibility of the judiciary and have overruled existing prece-
dents.5 0
Perhaps the following quotation from a lecture given at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska in the spring of 1953 by Harvard's Professor
47. "Therefore, when opinion among scholars who are not judges is uni-
form or nearly so and that among judges is in high confusion, the former
gives direction to the law of the future, while the latter points presently in all
directions. In such circumstances scholarly opinion has more than merely
persuasive effect. It is the safest guide for jurisdictions where the question
has never been determined." President & Directors of Georgetown College v.
Hughes, 76 App. D.C. 123, 130 Fed. 2d 810, 812 (1942).
48. See note 15 supra.
49. Gregory v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Or. 464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944).
50. Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954);
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260
P. 2d 765 (1953).
19551
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Warren A. Seavey, who will retire in 1955 after fifty years of teach-
ing law, is appropriate:
In other words, while prima facie there should be adherence
to the rules laid down in prior cases, stare decisis should be
recognized as primarily a principle existing to make easier the
work of the judges and to minimize litigation. Whenever both
justice and expediency are found united in requiring that a cause
of action be either created or destroyed under given circum-
stances, the fact that an earlier decision would lead to the op-
posite result should not be a bar; it should have only the effect
of causing the court to examine its premises more carefully.
It is true that changes in rules are likely to lead to more litiga-
tion since they produce a diminution of predictability, but
the primary function of the law is of course justice; the likeli-
hood of litigation alone should not be sufficient to prevent jus-
tice from being given. If the law of Torts is to perform its
function it must change with the needs and ideas of the com-
munity. That the more discerning courts have acted with rea-
sonable freedom has, I think, been demonstrated by the non-
statutory growth of the area in which relief has been given and
by the refinements which have been created both to extend and
to limit tort liability.5 ' (Emphasis added).
From the decisions in South Carolina the inconsistent fact stands
out that a person may be protected from a nuisance created by a
charity but he cannot be protected in life and limb. Furthermore,
a charity's contract which binds it to pay sums which may be above
the market price- although imprudently made through the negli-
gence of its agent- is enforceable, but when the same agent negli-
gently injures another the latter's claim for damages is not enforce-
able.
It would seem that the result is indefensible in a court of justice;
the only question is- whether it will be corrected by the courts or
by the legislature.
FLOYD D. SPzNCI.
51. SrAVEY, COGITATiONS o, ToRTs 68 (1954).
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